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This paper presents a model of the financial structure of private equity firms.  In the model, the general
partner of the firm encounters a sequence of deals over time where the exact quality of each deal cannot
be credibly communicated to investors. We show that the optimal financing arrangement is consistent
with a number of characteristics of the private equity industry. First, the firm should be financed by
a combination of fund capital raised before deals are encountered, and capital that is raised to finance
a specific deal. Second, the fund investors' claim on fund cash flow is a combination of debt and levered
equity, while the general partner receives a claim similar to the carry contracts received by real-world
practitioners. Third, the fund will be set up in a manner similar to that observed in practice, with investments
pooled within a fund, decision rights over investments held by the general partner, and limits set in
partnership agreements on the size of particular investments. Fourth, the model suggests that incentives
will lead to overinvestment in good states of the world and underinvestment in bad states, so that the
natural industry cycles will be multiplied.  Fifth, investments made in recessions will on average outperform
investments made in booms.
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weisbach@uiuc.eduPractitioner: “Things are really tough because the banks are only lending 4 times cash ﬂow,
when they used to lend 6 times cash ﬂow. We can’t make our deals proﬁtable anymore.”
Academic: “Why do you care if banks will not lend you as much as they used to? If you are
unable to lever up as much as before, your limited partners will receive lower expected returns on
any given deal, but the risk to them will have gone down proportionately.”
Practitioner: “Ah yes, the Modigliani-Miller theorem. I learned about that in business school.
We don’t think that way at our ﬁrm. Our philosophy is to lever our deals as much as we can, to
give the highest returns to our limited partners.”
1. Introduction
Private equity funds are responsible for a large and increasing quantity of investment in the economy.
According to a July 2006 estimate by Private Equity Intelligence, investors have allocated more
than $1.3 trillion globally for investments in private equity funds.1 These private equity funds
a r ea c t i v ei nav a r i e t yo fd i ﬀerent types of investments, from small startups to buyouts of large
conglomerates to investments in real estate and infrastructure. Private equity investments are now
of major importance not just in the United States, but internationally as well; for example, the
Wall Street Journal recently reported that private equity ﬁrms are responsible for 40% of M&A
activity in Germany (WSJ, Sept. 28, 2004, p. C1). Yet while a massive literature has developed
with the goal of understanding the ﬁnancing of corporate investments, very little work has been
done studying the ﬁnancing of the increasingly important investments of private equity funds.
Private equity investments are generally made by funds that share a common organizational
structure (see Sahlman (1990), or Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1997) for more discussion). Typically,
these funds raise equity at the time they are formed, and raise additional capital when investments
are made. This additional capital usually takes the form of debt when the investment is collateral-
izable, such as in buyouts, or equity from syndication partners when it is not, as in a startup. The
funds are usually organized as limited partnerships, with the limited partners (LPs) providing most
of the capital and the general partners (GPs) making investment decisions and receiving a substan-
tial share of the proﬁts (most often 20%). While the literature has spent much eﬀort understanding
some aspects of the private equity market, it is very surprising that there is no clear answers to
the basic questions of how funds are structured ﬁnancially, and what the impact of this structure
is on the funds’ choices of investments and their performance. Why is most private equity activity
undertaken by funds where LPs commit capital for a number of investments over the fund’s life?
Why are the equity investments of these funds complemented by deal-level ﬁnancing from third
parties? Why do GP compensation contracts have the nonlinear incentive structure commonly ob-
served in practice? What should we expect to observe about the relation between industry cycles,
1Ass reported by Financial Times, July 6 2006.
2bank lending practices, and the prices and returns of private equity investments? Why are booms
and busts in the private equity industry so prevalent?
In this paper, we propose a new explanation for the ﬁnancial structure of private equity ﬁrms.
Private equity ﬁrms rely on the ability of their general partners to make value-increasing invest-
ments. To do so, these managers must have suﬃcient freedom to be able to negotiate deals when
the GP becomes aware of them. Yet, this very freedom creates a fundamental governance problem;
limited partners commit capital to private equity funds with no right to sell their position or an
ability to vote out the fund’s managers.2 As such, governance issues in private equity funds are
potentially even more problematic than in public corporations. We argue in this paper that one
reason why a number of institutions commonly observed in private equity contracts arise is as
partial solutions to this fundamental governance problem.
We present a model based on this idea in which a number of features of private equity markets
arise as equilibrium outcomes. First, the model suggests that private equity investments should be
done through funds that pool investments across the fund. Second, funds should raise some capital
at the fund level, prior to discovering individual deals, and supplement fund-level capital with
additional, deal-speciﬁc capital. This additional capital takes the form of highly risky debt, and
should be raised from diﬀerent investors than the once who supply fund capital. Third, the payoﬀst o
GPs should be a nonlinear proﬁt-sharing arrangement similar to those observed in practice. Fourth,
somewhat paradoxically, the optimal fund structure involves giving complete discretion to the GPs
to undertake investments, without LPs being able to veto or otherwise interfere with investment
decisions. Fifth, the model predicts that the commonly-observed pattern of investments made
during busts outperforming investments made during booms on average is a natural consequence
of the contracting ineﬃciencies between GPs and LPs.
The model is in a sense a dynamic extension of the standard adverse selection model of Myers
and Majluf (1984) and Nachman and Noe (1994), in which informed ﬁrms raising capital from un-
informed investors have an incentive to overstate the quality of potential investments and therefore
cannot credibly communicate their information to the market. We assume that the GP faces two
potential investment opportunities over time which require ﬁnancing. The intertemporal element
of this problem leads to a new ﬁnancing decision for the GP relative to the static case considered
by the standard adverse selection model. We consider regimes when the GP raises capital on a deal
by deal basis (ex post ﬁnancing), raises a fund of capital to be used for several future projects (ex
ante ﬁnancing), or uses a combination of the two types of ﬁnancing.
With ex post ﬁnancing, the solution is the same as in the static adverse selection model. Debt
is be the optimal security, and GPs will choose to undertake all investments they can get ﬁnancing
for, even if those investments are value-decreasing. Whether deals will be ﬁnanced at all depends
2Limited partners often do have the right to terminate the partnership; however it typically takes 80% of the
value-weighted claims of the limited partners to do so. Sales of partnership interests require the approval of the GP.
3on the state of the economy — in good times, where the average project is positive NPV, there is
overinvestment, and in bad times there is underinvestment.
Ex ante ﬁnancing, however, can alleviate some of these problems. By tying the compensation
of the GP to the collective performance of a fund, the GP has less of an incentive to invest in bad
deals, since bad deals dilute his returns from the good deals. Tying pay-oﬀso fp a s ta n df u t u r e
investments together is in a sense a way to create inside wealth endogenously and to circumvent the
problems created by limited liability. Thus, a fund structure often dominates deal-by-deal capital
raising. Furthermore, debt is typically not the optimal security for a fund. Since the capital is
raised before the GP has learned the quality of the deals he will have an opportunity to invest in,
there is no such thing as a “good” GP who tries to minimize underpricing by issuing debt. Indeed,
issuing debt will maximize the risk shifting tenden c i e so faG Ps i n c ei tl e a v e sh i mw i t hac a l lo p t i o n
on the fund. We show that instead it is optimal to issue a security giving investors a debt contract
plus a levered equity stake, leaving the GP with a “carry” at the fund level that resembles contracts
observed in practice.
T h ed o w n s i d eo fp u r ee xa n t ec a p i t a lr a i s i n gi st h a ti tl e a v e st h eG Pw i t hs u b s t a n t i a lf r e e d o m .
Once the fund is raised, he does not have to go back to the capital markets, and so can fund deals
even in bad times. If the GP has not encountered enough good projects and is approaching the end
of the investment horizon, or if economic conditions shift so that not many good deals are expected
to arrive in the future, a GP with untapped funds has the incentive to “go for broke” and take bad
deals.
We show that it is therefore typically optimal to use a mix of ex ante and ex post capital. Giving
the GP funds ex ante preserves his incentives to avoid bad deals in good times, but the ex post
component has the eﬀect of preventing the GP from being able to invest in bad deals in bad times.
This ﬁnancing structure turns out to be optimal in the sense that it is the one that maximizes the
value of investments by minimizing the expected value of negative NPV investments undertaken
and good investments ignored. In addition, the structure of the securities in the optimal ﬁnancing
structure mirrors common practice; ex post deal funding is done with highly risky debt that has
to be raised from third parties such as banks, the LP’s claim is senior to the GP’s, and the GP’s
claim is a fraction of the proﬁts.
Even with this optimal ﬁnancing structure, investment nonetheless deviates from its ﬁrst-best
level. In particular, during good states of the world, ﬁrms are prone to overinvestment, meaning
that some negative net present value investments will be undertaken. In addition, during bad states
of the world, there will be underinvestment, i.e., valuable projects that cannot be ﬁnanced. During
recessions, there not only will not be as many valuable investment opportunities, but those that
do exist will have diﬃculty being ﬁnanced. Similarly, during boom times, not only will there be
more good projects than in bad times, but bad projects will be ﬁnanced in addition to the good
ones. The implication of this pattern is that the informational imperfections we model are likely
4to exacerbate normal business cycle patterns of investment, creating a cyclicality multiplier. Thus,
the investment distortions described by our model are a potential explanation for the common
observation that the private equity investment process is extremely procyclical (see Gompers and
Lerner (1999b)). This logic also suggests that there is some validity to the common complaint from
GPs that during tough times it is diﬃcult to get ﬁnancing for even very good projects, but during
good times many poor projects get ﬁnanced.
An empirical implication of this result is that returns to investments made during booms will
be lower on average than the returns to investments made during poor times. Consistent with this
implication is anecdotal evidence about poor investments made during the internet and biotech
bubbles, as well as some of the most successful deals being initiated during busts. More formally,
academic studies have found evidence of such countercyclical investment performance in both the
buyout (Kaplan and Stein, 1993) and the venture capital market (Gompers and Lerner, 2000).
Our paper relates to a theoretical literature that analyzes the eﬀect of pooling on investment
incentives and optimal contracting. Diamond (1984) shows that by changing the cash ﬂow dis-
tribution, investment pooling makes it possible to design contracts that incentivizes the agent to
monitor the investments properly. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Laux (2001) show that tying
investment decisions together can create “inside wealth” for the agent undertaking the investments,
which reduces the limited liability constraint and helps design more eﬃcient contracts. Unlike our
model, neither of these papers consider project choice under adverse selection, or have any role for
outside equity in the optimal contract. Our paper also relates to an emerging literature analyzing
private equity fund structures.3 Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) and Kandel, Leshchinskii, and
Yuklea (2006) also argue that fund structures can lead GPs to make ineﬃcient investments in risky
projects. Unlike our paper, however, these papers take fund structures as given and do not derive
investment incentives resulting from an optimal contract. Inderst and Muennich (2004) argue that
pooling private equity investments together in a fund helps the GP commit to eﬃcient liquidation
decisions in a manner similar to the winner-picking model of Stein (1997). However, the Inderst
and Muennich mechanism relies on always making the fund capital constrained, which we show is
not optimal in our model. Most importantly, none of the previous theoretical papers analyze the
interplay of ex ante pooled ﬁnancing and ex post deal-by-deal ﬁnancing, which lies at the heart of
our model.
The next section presents the model and its implications. There is a discussion and conclusion
following the model.
3Lerner and Schoar (2003) also model private equity fund structures, but focus on explaining the transfer restric-
tions of limited partnership shares.
52. Model
There are three types of agents in the model: General partners (GPs), limited partners (LPs) and
ﬂy-by-night operators. All agents are risk-neutral, and have access to a storage technology yielding
the risk-free rate, which we assume to be zero.
The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 2.1. There are two periods. Each period a
candidate ﬁrm arrives. We assume it costs I to invest in a ﬁrm. Firms are of two kinds: good (G)
and bad (B). The quality of the ﬁrm is only observed by the GP. A good ﬁrm has cash ﬂow Z>0
for sure, and a bad ﬁrm has cash ﬂow 0 with probability 1−p,a n dc a s hﬂow Z with probability p,
where:
Z>I>p Z
Good ﬁrms therefore have positive net present values, while bad ﬁr m sh a v ean e g a t i v eN P V .A l l
cash ﬂows are realized at the end of the second period.
Each period a good ﬁrm arrives with probability α,a n dab a dﬁrm with probability 1 − α.4
We think of α as representing the common perception of the quality of the type of deals associated
with the specialty of the GP that are available at a point in time. To facilitate the analysis, we
assume there are only two possible values for α, αH which occurs with probability q each period,
and αL which occurs with probability 1−q each period. Also, we assume αH >α L.S i n c ew ew o u l d
like α to reﬂect possibly unmeasureable perceptions in the marketplace, we assume it is observable
but not veriﬁable, so it cannot be contracted on directly.
Furthermore, we assume that there is an inﬁnite supply of unserious ﬂy-by-night operators that
investors cannot distinguish from a serious GP. Fly-by-night operators can only ﬁnd useless ﬁrms
with a maximum payoﬀ less than capital invested, or store money at the riskless rate.
2.1. Securities
We assume the GP has no money of his own and ﬁnances his investments by issuing a security
wI (x) backed by the cash ﬂow x from the investments, and keeps the residual security wGP (x)=
x − wI (x).5 The securities have to satisfy the following monotonicity condition:
Monotonicity wI(x),w GP (x) are non-decreasing.
4Equivalently, we can assume that there are always bad ﬁrms available, and a good ﬁrm arrives with probability
α.
5If the GP had suﬃcient capital, the agency problems would be alleviated if he were to ﬁnance a suﬃciently large
part of the investments himself. In practice, GPs typically contribute 1% of the partnership’s capital personally.
However, so long as the GP cannot ﬁnance such a large part of investments that the agency problems completely
disappear, allowing for GP wealth does not change the qualitative nature of our results.
6This assumption is standard in the security design literature and can be formally justiﬁed on
grounds of moral hazard.6 An equivalent way of expressing the monotonicity condition is
x − x0 ≥ wGP (x) − wGP
¡
x0¢
≥ 0 ∀x,x0 s.t. x>x 0
However, if the security issued pays oﬀ less than the total cash ﬂow whenever the cash ﬂow is
below the invested capital K, the ﬂy-by-night operators can store the money and earn rents. Since
the supply of ﬂy-by-night operators is potentially inﬁnite, there cannot be an equilibrium where
ﬂy-by-night operators earn positive rents and investors break even. Any candidate equilibrium
security design therefore has to satisfy:
Fly-by-night For invested capital K, wGP (x)=0whenever x ≤ K.
The existence of ﬂy-by-night operators also implies that GPs should be contractually prohibited
from investing in any public capital market securities, such as stocks or options. Otherwise, there
would always be some chance for a ﬂy-by-night operator to earn a positive surplus by gambling in
securities markets, so that limited partners could never break even.7
2.2. Forms of Capital Raising
In a ﬁrst best world, the GP will invest in all good ﬁrms and no bad ﬁrms. Because the GP
has private information about ﬁr mt y p e ,t h i si n v e s t m e n tp o l i c yw i l ln o tb ea c h i e v a b l e-t h e r ew i l l
typically be overinvestment in bad projects and underinvestment in good projects. Our objective is
to ﬁnd a method of capital raising that minimizes these ineﬃciencies. We consider three methods
of capital raising:
• Pure ex post capital raising is done in each period after the GP encounters a ﬁrm. The
securities investors get are backed by each individual investment’s cash ﬂow.
• Pure ex ante capital raising is done in period zero before the GP encounters any ﬁrm. The
security investors get is backed by the sum of the cash ﬂows from the investments in both
periods.
6See, for example, Innes (1990) or Nachman and Noe (1994). Suppose an investor claim w(x) is decreasing on
ar e g i o na<x<b , and that the underlying cash ﬂow turns out to be a. The GP then has an incentive to secretly
borrow money from a third party and add it on to the aggregate cash ﬂow to push it into the decreasing region,
thereby reducing the payment to the security holder while still being able to pay back the third party. Similarly, if
the GP’s retained claim is decreasing over some region a<x≤ b and the realized cash ﬂow is b,t h eG Ph a sa n
incentive to decrease the observed cash ﬂow by burning money.
7This assumption also distinguishes our results from the model of Myers and Majluf (1984). In their model, a
ﬁrm would never raise ﬁnancing and invest in a negative net present value project, because they implicitly assume
that there is also the possibility of investing in zero net present value assets with similar risk as the investment being
considered, such as stocks of publicly traded companies.
7• All agents observe 
pd. 1 state H or L
• Firm 1 arrives. GP 
observes firm type G 
or B.
• Raise ex post capital?
•C a s h  f l o w s  
realized
Raise ex ante 
capital?
1 t: 0 2 3
• All agents observe 
pd. 2 state H or L
• Firm 2 arrives. GP 
observes firm type G 
or B.
• Raise ex post capital?
Figure 2.1: Timeline
• Ex ante and ex post capital raising uses a combination of the two approaches. Investors
supplying ex post capital in a period receive a security backed by the cash ﬂow from the
investment in that period only. Investors supplying ex ante capital receive a security backed
by the cash ﬂows from both investments combined.
We now analyze and compare each of these ﬁnancing arrangements.8
3. Pure ex post capital raising
We now characterize the pure ex post capital raising solution. We start by analyzing the simpler
static problem in which the world ends after one period, and then show that the one period solution
is also an equilibrium period by period in the dynamic problem.
In a one-period problem, the timing is as follows: After observing the ﬁrm’s quality, the GP
decides whether to seek ﬁnancing. After raising capital, he decides whether to invest in the ﬁrm or
in the riskless asset.
Given these assumptions, the GP has an incentive to seek ﬁnancing regardless of the ﬁrm’s
q u a l i t y ,s i n c eh er e c e i v e sn o t hing otherwise. To invest in a ﬁrm, the GP must raise I by issuing a
security wI (x),w h e r ex ∈ {0,I,Z}. Also, in any equilibrium where the GP receives ﬁnancing and
investors break even, the GP cannot get anything if the cash ﬂow from his investment is below I.
O t h e r w i s e ,t h e r ew i l lb ea ni n ﬁnite supply of ﬂy-by-night operators who can earn a positive return
by raising money and investing in the riskfree asset. Therefore, the security design has wI (I)=I.
But this in turn implies that the GP will invest both in bad and good ﬁrms whenever he can raise
8This is not an exhaustive list of ﬁnancing methods. We brieﬂy discuss slightly diﬀerent forms below as well, such
as raising ex ante capital for only one period, raising only one unit of capital for the two periods, and allowing for ex
post securities to be backed by more than one deal. None of these other methods improve over the once we analyze
in more detail.
8capital, since his payoﬀ is zero if he invests in the riskless asset. A GP with a good ﬁrm cannot
separate himself from a GP with a bad ﬁrm, so the only equilibrium is a pooling one in which all
GPs issue the same security.
The security pays oﬀ only if x = Z, so the break even condition for investors after learning the
expected fraction of good ﬁrms α in the period is
(α +( 1− α)p)wI (Z) ≥ I
Thus, ﬁnancing is feasible as long as
(α +( 1− α)p)Z ≥ I
and in that case, the GP will invest in all ﬁrms. The payoﬀ wI (Z) w i l lb es e ts ot h a ti n v e s t o r s
just break even, and the security can be thought of as debt with face value wI (Z). When it is
impossible to satisfy the break even condition, the GP cannot invest in any ﬁrms.
We assume that the unconditional probability of success is too low for investors to break even:
Condition 3.1.
(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p)Z<I
Condition 3.1 implies that ex post ﬁnancing is not possible in the low state. Whether pure ex
post ﬁnancing is possible in the high state depends on whether (αH +( 1− αH)p)Z ≥ I holds.
The two-period problem is somewhat more complicated, as the observed investment behavior in
the ﬁrst period may change investors’ belief about whether a GP is a ﬂy-by-night operator, which
in turn aﬀects the ﬁnancing equilibrium in the second period. We show in the appendix, however,
that a repeated version of the one-period problem is still an equilibrium:9,10
Proposition 1. Pure ex post ﬁnancing is never feasible in the low state. If
(αH +( 1− αH)p)Z ≥ I
9The equilibrium concept we use is Bayesian Nash, together with the requirement that the equilibrium satisﬁes
the “Intuitive Criterion” of Cho and Kreps (1987).
10The result only holds if we stick to the assumption that the GP is not allowed to invest in zero net present value
public market securities, such as the S&P500. Above, we argued that it is optimal to disallow such investments in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fﬂy-by-night operators. However, this will no longer be true in the second period if it is assumed that
ﬂy-by-night operators do not raise money and invest in the ﬁrst period, since they are then screened out. But if it
was anticipated that such investments would be allowed in the second period for GPs who invested in the ﬁrst period,
there would be no way to screen out ﬂy-by-night operators. One can show that the whole market for ﬁnancing would
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Figure 3.1: Investment behavior in the pure ex post ﬁnancing case. X denotes that an investment
is made, O that no investment is made.
it is feasible in the high state, where the GP issues debt with face value F given by
F =
I
αH +( 1− αH)p
I nt h es o l u t i o na b o v e ,w ea s s u m et h a tﬂy-by-night operators do not try to raise ﬁnancing, or if
they do raise ﬁnancing, that they invest in the risk free asset since they gain nothing regardless of
their investment strategy.11
3.1. Eﬃciency
The investment behavior with pure ex post ﬁnancing is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Investment is
ineﬃcient in both high and low states. There is always underinvestment in the low state since good
deals cannot get ﬁnanced. In the high state, there is underinvestment if the break even condition
of investors cannot be met, and overinvestment if it can, since then bad deals get ﬁnanced.
4. Pure Ex Ante Financing
We now study the polar case in which the GP raises all the capital to be used over the two periods
for investment ex ante, before the state of the economy is realized. Suppose the GP raises 2I of
11We could also have imagined period-by-period ﬁnancing where the security is issued after the state of the economy
is realized, but before the GP knows what type of ﬁrm he will encounter in the period. In a one-period problem, the
solution would be the same as for the pure ex post case analyzed above. However, one can show that if there is more
than one period, the market for ﬁnancing would completely break down except for the last period. This is because
if there is a ﬁnancing equilibrium where ﬂy-by-night operators are screened out in early periods, there would be an
incentive to issue straight equity and avoid risk shifting in later periods. (As we show in the proof of Proposition
1, straight equity does not survive the Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion when GPs know the type of their
project at the time of issuance, but this is no longer true when the security is issued ex ante.) But straight equity
leaves rents to ﬂy-by-night operators, who therefore would proﬁt from mimicking serious GPs in earlier periods by
investing in wasteful projects. Therefore, it is impossible to screen them out of the market in early periods, so there
can be no ﬁnancing at all.
10ex ante capital in period zero, implying that the GP is not capital constrained and can potentially
invest in both periods.12
W es o l v ef o rt h eG P ’ ss e c u r i t ywGP (x)=x − wI (x) that maximizes investment eﬃciency.
For all monotonic stakes, the GP will invest in all good ﬁrms he encounters over the two periods.
However, if no investment was made in period 1, it is impossible to motivate him to avoid investing
in a bad ﬁrm in period 2. This ineﬃciency follows from the ﬂy-by-night condition, since the GP’s
payoﬀ has to be zero when fund cash ﬂows are less than or equal to the capital invested.
We show that it is possible to design wGP (x) so that the GP avoids all other ineﬃciencies.
Under this second-best contract, he avoids bad ﬁrms in period 1, and avoids bad ﬁr m si np e r i o d2
as long as an investment took place in period 1.
T os o l v ef o rt h eo p t i m a ls e c u r i t y ,w em a x i m i z et h eG Pp a y o ﬀ subject to the monotonicity, ﬂy-by-
night, and investor break even conditions, and make sure that the second-best investment behavior is
incentive compatible. The security payoﬀs wGP (x) must be deﬁned over the following potential fund
cash ﬂows: x ∈ {0,I,2I,Z,Z + I,2Z}. Note that under a second-best contract, x ∈ {0,2I,Z} will
never occur. These cash ﬂows would result from the cases of two failed investments, no investment,
and one failed and one successful investment respectively, neither of which can result from the GP’s
optimal investment strategy. Nonetheless, we still need to deﬁne security payoﬀs for these cash ﬂow
outcomes to ensure that the contract is incentive compatible.
The ﬂy-by-night condition immediately implies that wGP (x)=0for x ≤ 2I. The following
lemma shows that only one inequality has to be satisﬁed to induce the GP to follow the described
investment behavior above:
Lemma 1. For the pure ex ante case, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a contract wGP (x)
to induce the GP to only invest in good ﬁrms in period 1 and, if an investment was made in period
1, to pass up a bad ﬁrm in period 2 is given by:
(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p)wGP (Z + I) (4.1)
≥ ((1 − p)E (α)+2 p(1 − p)(1− E (α)))wGP (Z)
+p(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p)wGP (2Z)
Proof. In Appendix.
The left hand side is the expected payoﬀ for a GP who encounters a bad ﬁrm in period 1,
passes it up, and then invests in any ﬁrm that appears in period 2. The right hand side is the
expected payoﬀ if he invests in the bad ﬁrm in period 1, and then invests in any ﬁrm in period
12Below we show that in the pure ex ante case, it is never optimal to make the GP capital constrained by giving
him less than 2I.
112. Therefore, when Condition 4.1 holds, the GP will never invest in a bad ﬁrm in period 1.13 For
incentive compatibility, we also must ensure that the GP does not invest in a bad ﬁrm in period 2
after investing in a good ﬁrm in period 1. It turns out that this incentive compatibility constraint
holds whenever Condition 4.1 is satisﬁed.







2E (α)(1− E (α)) + (1 − E (α))
2 p
´
wGP (Z + I)
such that
E (x − wGP (x)) ≥ 2I (BE)
(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p)wGP (Z + I) ≥ (IC)
((1 − p)E (α)+2 p(1 − p)(1− E (α)))wGP (Z)
+p(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p)wGP (2Z)
x − x0 ≥ wGP (x) − wGP (x0) ≥ 0 ∀x,x0 s.t. x>x 0 (M)
wGP (x)=0 ∀x s.t. x ≤ 2I (FBN)
T h e r ea r et w op o s s i b l ep a y o ﬀs to the GP in the maximand. The ﬁrst payoﬀ, wGP (2Z),o c c u r s
only when good ﬁrms are encountered in both periods. The second payoﬀ, wGP (Z + I), will occur
either (1) when one good ﬁrm is encountered in the ﬁrst or the second period, or (2) when no good
ﬁrm is encountered in any of the two periods, and the GP invests in a bad ﬁrm in period 2 that turns
out to be successful. Condition BE is the investor’s break-even condition. Finally, the maximization
has to satisfy the monotonicity (M) and the ﬂy-by-night condition (FBN). T h ef e a s i b l es e ta n d
the optimal security design which solves this program is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Pure ex ante ﬁnancing is feasible if and only if it creates social surplus. An optimal
investor security wI(x) (which is not always unique) is given by
wI(x)=
(
min(x,F) x ≤ Z + I
F + k(x − (Z + I)) x>Z+ I
13It could be that if the GP invests in a bad ﬁrm in period 1, he would prefer to pass up a bad ﬁrm encountered
in period 2. For incentive compatibility, it is necessary to ensure that the GP gets a higher pay oﬀ when avoiding a























Figure 4.1: GP securities (wGP (x)) and investor securities (wI (x)) as a function of fund cash ﬂow
x in the pure ex ante case. The three graphs depict contracts under high (top left graph), medium
(top right graph), and low (bottom graph) levels of E (α). A high level of E (α) corresponds to
high social surplus created, which in turn means that a lower fraction of fund cash ﬂows have to
be pledged to investors.
where F ≥ 2I and k ∈ (0,1).
Proof: See appendix.
Figure 4.1 shows the form of the optimal securities for diﬀerent levels of social surplus created,
where a lower surplus will imply that a higher fraction of fund cash ﬂow has to be pledged to
investors. This structure resembles the structure of actual securities used by private equity funds,
in which investors get all cash ﬂows below their invested amount and a proportion of the cash
ﬂows above that. Moreover, as shown in the proof, the contracts tend to have an intermediate
region, where all the additional cash ﬂo w sa r eg i v e nt ot h eG P .T h i sr e g i o ni ss i m i l a rt oap r o v i s i o n
referred to in practice as "Carried Interest Catch Up," which is commonly used in private equity
partnership agreements.
The intuition for the pure ex ante contract is as follows. If the GP were to receive a straight
equity claim, he would make the ﬁrst-best investments, i.e., take all positive net present value
investments and otherwise invests in the risk-free asset. However, the problem with straight equity
is that the GP receives a positive payoﬀ even if no capital is invested, allowing ﬂy-by-night operators
to make money. To avoid this problem, GPs can be paid only if the fund cash ﬂows are suﬃciently
high, introducing a risk-shifting incentive. The risk-shifting problem is most severe if investors



















































Figure 4.2: Investment behavior in the pure ex ante (A) compared to the pure ex post (P) case
when ex post ﬁnancing is possible in the high state.
minimizes the losses to risk shifting by reducing the levered equity claim of the GP and giving a
fraction of the high cash ﬂows to investors.14
Another way to why it is eﬃcient for investors to receive a fraction of high cash ﬂows (and
hence make their payoﬀs more "equity-like") is by examining the IC constraint of the GP. When
Z ≤ 2I, the IC constraint simpliﬁes to wGP (Z + I) ≥ pwGP (2Z), implying an upper bound on
the fraction that the GP can receive of the highest fund cash ﬂows.
As the investors have to be given more rents (to satisfy their break-even constraint), it is
optimal to increase the payoﬀ to investors for the highest cash ﬂow states (2Z) ﬁrst, while keeping
the payoﬀs to GPs for the intermediate cash ﬂow states (Z + I) as high as possible to reduce risk-
shifting incentives. While our model set up delivers an intermediate region where investor payoﬀs
are ﬂat, we believe that this is not a generic feature of more general models. In particular, if we
were to allow good projects to also have some risk, this ﬂat region will likely disappear in favor of
a more smooth equity piece given to investors.
4.1. Eﬃciency
The investment behavior in the pure ex ante relative to the pure ex post case is illustrated in Figure
4.2. In the ex ante case, the GP invests eﬃciently in period 1, meaning that he will accept good
projects and reject bad ones. If he has access to and invests in a good project in the ﬁrst period,
then the investment will be eﬃcient in period 2 as well. The only ineﬃciency is that the GP will
invest in the bad ﬁrm in period 2 in the case where he encounters bad ﬁr m si ne a c hp e r i o d .
The ex ante fund structure can improve incentives relative to the ex post deal-by-deal structure
14This is similar to the classic intuition of Jensen and Meckling (1976).
14by tying the payoﬀ of several investments together and structuring the GP incentives appropriately.
In the ex post case, the investment ineﬃciency is caused by the inability to reward the GP for
avoiding bad investments, since any compensation system that did so would violate the ﬂy-by-
night condition. In the ex ante case, the GP can be motivated to avoid bad ﬁrms as long as
there is a possibility of ﬁnding a good ﬁrm in the second period. By giving the GP a stake
that resembles straight equity for cash ﬂows above the invested amount, he will make eﬃcient
investment decisions as long as he anticipates being “in the money”. Tying payoﬀso fp a s ta n d
future investments together is in a sense a way to improve incentives to invest in only good ﬁrms.
When investment proﬁts are tied together this way, bad investments dilute the returns from good
investments, motivating managers to avoid making bad investments.
This logic suggests that one reason why investments are comingled within funds is that by
doing so, managers are motivated to pick better investments. The one time when these incentives
break down is when the ﬁrm faces a series of bad investments. The real-world counterpart to this
case is when a partnership approaches the end of the ’commitment period’ with a large pool of
still-uninvested capital. Our model formalizes the concern voiced by practitioners today that the
large overhang of uninvested capital can lead to partnerships overpaying for assets.
So far we have restricted the analysis of the ex ante case to a situation where the GP raises
enough funds to invest in all ﬁrms. It turns out that this ﬁnancing strategy dominates an ex ante
structure in which the GP is capital constrained. To see why, suppose the GP only raises enough
funds to invest in one ﬁrm over the two periods. He will then pass up bad ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period
in the hope of ﬁnding a good ﬁrm in the second period. Just as in the previous case, there is no
way of preventing him from investing in a bad ﬁrm in the second period. However, there is an
additional ineﬃciency in the constrained case, however, in that good ﬁr m sh a v et ob ep a s s e du pi n
period 2 whenever an investment was made in period 1.15 Thus, investment eﬃciency is improved
if private equity funds are not constrained in the amount of equity capital they have access to.
This argument potentially explains the empirical ﬁnding of Ljungquist and Richardson (2003), who
document that private equity funds seldom use up all their capital before raising a new fund.
Although the ex ante fund structure can improve eﬃciency over the pure ex post case, it
is clear from Figure 4.2 that it need not always be the case. Clearly, pure ex ante ﬁnancing
always dominates when pure ex post ﬁnancing is not even feasible in the high state, i.e. when
(αH +( 1− αH)p)Z<I .Ex ante ﬁnancing is feasible whenever it creates any positive surplus,
which occurs as long as investors break even for the contract wGP (x)=0for all x.W h e ne xp o s t
15This result is in contrast with the winner picking models in Stein (1997) and Inderst and Muennich (2004).
15ﬁnancing is feasible in the high state, ex ante ﬁnancing will still be more eﬃcient whenever:
(1 − E (α))
2 (I − pZ)
≤ 2(q(1 − αH)(I − pZ)+( 1− q)αL (Z − I))
The left hand side is the NPV loss from investing in a bad project the second period, I − pZ,
times the likelihood of this happening (probability of two bad ﬁrms in a row), (1−E (α))2.T h er i g h t
hand side is the eﬃciency loss from ex post raising, which is that some bad ﬁrms are ﬁnanced in the
high state (which happens with probability q(1 − αH) in each period) and some good ﬁrms are not
ﬁnanced in the low state (which happens with probability (1 − q)αL in each period). Intuitively,
ex post ﬁnancing has the disadvantage that the GP will always invest in any ﬁrm he encounters in
high states and cannot be motivated to make use of his information about investment. However, ex
post ﬁnancing also has the advantage that it is dependent on the realized value of α,w h i c he xa n t e
ﬁnancing cannot be, since α is not known when funds are raised and is not veriﬁable, so contracts
cannot be written contingent on its value.
T h er e l a t i v ee ﬃiciency of ex post and ex ante ﬁnancing depends on how informative α is about
project quality. If low states are very unlikely to have good projects (αL close to zero) and high
states have almost only good projects (αH close to one) the ineﬃciency with ex post fund raising
is small. When the correlation between states and project quality is not so strong, pure ex ante
ﬁnancing will dominate.
However, even when pure ex ante ﬁnancing is more eﬃcient, it still may not be privately optimal
for the GP to use. The ex ante ﬁnancing contract must be structured so that the LPs get some
of the upside for the GP to follow the right investment strategy, which sometimes will leave the
LPs with strictly positive rents. So, there are cases in which total rents are higher under ex ante
ﬁnancing than under ex post ﬁnancing, but the GP prefers ex post ﬁnancing because he does not
have to share the rents with the LPs. The following proposition characterizes the circumstances
under which the GP leaves rents for the LP.
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then the LP gets a strictly positive rent in equilibrium with pure ex ante ﬁnancing. Otherwise, the
GP captures all the rent.
Proof. See appendix.
This result may shed some light on the seemingly puzzling ﬁnding in Kaplan and Schoar (2004)
that succesful GPs seem not to increase their fees in follow-up funds enough to force LPs down to
16a competitive rent, but rather ration the number of LPs they let into the fund.
5. Mixed ex ante and ex post ﬁnancing
We now examine the model when managers can use a combination of ex post and ex ante capital
raising. In the case when managers raise suﬃcient funding ex ante so they can potentially take all
investments, the resulting equilibrium includes bad as well as good investments. This overinvestment
occurs because when the GP does not invest in a bad ﬁrm in period 1, he will then invest in any
ﬁrm that comes along in period 2, regardless of its quality. The possibility of using a combination
of ex post and ex ante capital raising can limit this overinvestment in the second state without
destroying period 1 incentives. It does so by making the GP somewhat capital constrained by
limiting the funds that can be used for ex ante ﬁnancing, and requiring him to go back to the
market for additional capital to be able to make an investment.
To consider this possibility, we now assume that the GP raises 2K<2I of ex ante fund capital
in period 0, and is only allowed to use K for investments each period.16 The remaining I − K has
to be raised ex post, after the investments are discovered. As we show below, it is critical that ex
post investors are distinct from ex ante investors.
Ex post investors in period i get security wP,i(xi) backed by the cash ﬂow xi from the investment
in period i. Ex ante investors and the GP get securities wI (x) and wGP (x)=x−wI (x) respectively,
backed by the fund cash ﬂow x = x1 − wP,1 (x1)+x2 − wP,2 (x2) (where wP,i is zero if no ex post
ﬁnancing is raised). The ﬂy-by-night condition is now that wGP (x)=0for all x ≤ 2K. Finally,
we also assume that whether the GP invests in the risk-free asset or a ﬁrm is observable by market
participants, but it is infeasible to write contracts contingent upon this observation.
We characterize the contracts that lead to the most eﬃcient equilibrium. Given these assump-
tions, it is sometimes possible to implement an equilibrium in which the GP invests only in good
ﬁr m si np e r i o d1 ,o n l yi ng o o dﬁrms in period 2 if the GP invested in a ﬁrm in period 1, and only in
the high state if there was no investment in period 1.17 As is seen in Figure 5.1, this equilibrium is
more eﬃcient than the one arising from pure ex ante ﬁnancing since it avoids investment in the low
s t a t ei np e r i o d2a f t e rn oi n v e s t m e n th a sb e e nd o n ei np e r i o d1 .I ti sa l s om o r ee ﬃcient than the
equilibrium in the pure ex post case, since pure ex post capital raising has the added ineﬃciencies
that no good investments are undertaken in low states, and bad investments are undertaken in high
states (if ex post capital raising is feasible).
16It is common in private equity contracts to restrict the amount the GP is allowed to invest in any one deal.
17Note that it is impossible to implement an equilibrium where the GP only invests in good ﬁrms over both periods,
since if there is no investment in period 1, he will always have an incentive to invest in period 2 whether he ﬁnds a



















































Figure 5.1: Investment behavior in the pure ex ante (A), pure ex post (P), and the postulated
mixed (M) case when ex post ﬁnancing is possible in the high state.
5.1. Ex Post Securities
We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a tt oi m p l e m e n tt h em o s te ﬃcient outcome described above, the optimal ex post
security is debt. Furthermore, the required leverage to ﬁnance each deal should be suﬃciently high
so that ex post investors are unwilling to lend in circumstances where the risk-shifting problem is
severe.
If the GP raises ex post capital in period i,t h ec a s hﬂow xi can potentially take on values in
{0,I,Z}, corresponding to a failed investment, a risk-free investment, and a successful investment.
If the GP does not raise any ex post capital, he cannot invest in a ﬁrm, and saves the ex ante
capital K for that period, so that xi = K. The security wP,1 issued to ex post investors in period
1 in exchange for supplying the needed capital I − K must satisfy a ﬂy-by-night constraint and a
break-even constraint:
wP,1 (I) − (I − K) ≥ 0 (5.1)
wP,1 (Z) ≥ I − K (5.2)
The ﬂy-by-night constraint 5.1 ensures that a ﬂy-by-night operator in coalition with an LP cannot
raise ﬁnancing from ex post investors, invest in the risk-free security, and make a strictly positive
proﬁt. The break even constraint 5.2 presumes that in equilibrium, only good investments are
made in period 1, so that the cash-ﬂow will be Z for sure. For ex post investors to break even,
they require a payout of at least I − K when xi = Z. T h ee xp o s ts e c u r i t yt h a ts a t i s ﬁes these two
conditions and leaves no surplus to ex post investors is risk-free debt with face value I − K.
18A parallel argument establishes debt as optimal for ex post ﬁnancing in the second period in
the case when no investment was made in the ﬁrst. The ﬂy-by-night condition stays unchanged,
but the break even-condition becomes
wP,2 (Z) ≥
I − K
α +( 1− α)p
(5.3)
The face value of the debt increases relative to the face value in the ﬁrst period because when
no investment has been made in the ﬁrst period, the GP will have an incentive to raise money
and invest even when he encounters a bad ﬁrm in period 2. To break even given this expected
investment behavior, the cheapest security to issue is debt with face value of I−K
α+(1−α)p.
The last and trickiest case to analyze is the situation in period 2 when there has been an
investment in period 1. The postulated equilibrium requires that no bad investments are then
made in period 2. Furthermore, since ﬂy-by-night operators are not supposed to have invested in
period 1, ex post investors know that ﬂy-by-night operators have been screened out. Therefore,
we cannot use the ﬂy-by-night constraint in our argument for debt. Nevertheless, as we show in
the appendix, an application of the Cho and Kreps reﬁnement used in the proof of Proposition 1
implies that wP,2 (I) ≥ I − K. To see why, if wP,2 (I) <I− K,G P sﬁnding bad ﬁrms will raise
money and invest in the risk-free security. This in turn will drive up the cost of capital for GPs
ﬁnding good ﬁrms, who therefore have an incentive to issue a more debt-like security. Therefore,
risk-free debt is the only possible equilibrium security.
To sum up, debt is the optimal ex post security,a n di tc a nb em a d er i s kf r e ew i t hf a c ev a l u e
F = I −K in period 1, and in period 2 if an investment was made earlier. When no investment has
been made in period 1, optimal investment requires conditions on the quantity of ex post capital.
In particular, the amount of capital I − K the GP raises must be low enough so that the GP can
invest in the high state, but high enough such that the GP cannot invest in the low state. Using
the break even condition 5.3, the condition for this is:
(αH +( 1− αH)p)Z ≥ I − K ≥ (αL +( 1− αL)p)Z (5.4)
We summarize our results on ex post securities in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. With mixed ﬁnancing, the optimal ex post security is debt in each period. The
debt is risk-free with face value I − K in period 1 and in period 2 if an investment was made in
p e r i o d1 .I fn oi n v e s t m e n tw a sm a d ei np e r i o d1 ,a n dt h ep e r i o d2s t a t ei sh i g h ,t h ef a c ev a l u eo f
debt is equal to I−K
αH+(1−αH)p. The external capital I − K raised each period satisﬁes
(αH +( 1− αH)p)Z ≥ I − K ≥ (αL +( 1− αL)p)Z
19If no investment was made in period 1 and the period 2 state is low the GP cannot raise any ex
post debt.
Proof. See appendix.
5.2. Ex Ante Securities
We now solve for the ex ante securities wI (x) and wGP (x)=x − wI (x),a sw e l la st h ea m o u n t
of per period ex ante capital K. The security payoﬀsm u s tb ed e ﬁned over the following potential
fund cash ﬂows, which are net of payments to ex post investors:
Fund cash ﬂow x Investments
0 2 failed investments.
Z − (I − K) 1 failed and 1 successful investment.
K 1 failed investment.
2K No investment.
Z − I−K
αH+(1−αH)p + K 1 successful investment in period 2.
Z − (I − K)+K 1 successful investment in period 1.
2(Z − (I − K)) 2 successful investments.
Note that the ﬁrst two cash ﬂows cannot happen in the proposed equilibrium and that the last
three cash ﬂows are in strictly increasing order. In particular, as opposed to the pure ex ante case,
the expected fund cash ﬂow now diﬀers for the case where there is only one succesful investment
depending on whether the ﬁrm is encountered in the ﬁrst or second period. This diﬀerence occurs
because if the good ﬁrm is encountered in the second period, the GP is pooled with other GPs
who encounter bad ﬁrms, so that ex post investors will demand a higher face value before they are
willing to ﬁnance the investment.
The following lemma provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition on the GP payoﬀst oi m p l e -
ment the desired equilibrium investment behavior. Just as in the pure ex ante case, it is suﬃcient
to ensure that the GP does not invest in bad ﬁr m si np e r i o d1 .
Lemma 2. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for a contract wGP (x) to be incentive compatible
in the mixed ex ante and ex post case is








>E (α)(pwGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))) + (1 − E(α)) ∗
∗pmax[wGP (Z − (I − K)+K),pw GP (2(Z − (I − K))) + 2(1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))]
Proof. In appendix.
20The left hand side of the inequality in Lemma 1 is the expected payoﬀ t ot h eG Pi fh ep a s s e s
up a bad ﬁrm in period 1. He will then be able to invest in period 2 if the state is high (probability
q), and will be rewarded if the second period ﬁrm is successful (probability αH +( 1− αH)p). If
the state in period 2 is low, he cannot invest, and will get a zero payoﬀ because of the ﬂy-by-night
constraint. The right hand side is the expected payoﬀ if the GP deviates and invests in a bad ﬁrm
i np e r i o d1 . I nt h i sc a s e ,h ew i l lb ea b l et or a i s ed e b ta tf a c ev a l u eF = I − K in both periods,
since the market assumes that he is investing eﬃciently. The ﬁr s tl i n eo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d ei sh i s
payoﬀ if he ﬁnds a good ﬁr mi np e r i o d2 .T h el a s tl i n ei sh i sp a y o ﬀ when he ﬁnds a bad ﬁrm in
period 2, in which case his investment decision will depend on the relative payoﬀs.
Just as in the pure ex ante case, the incentive compatibility condition 5.5 shows that it is
necessary to give part of the upside to investors to avoid risk-shifting by the GP. In particular, the
GP stake after two successful investments (wGP (2(Z − (I − K)))) cannot be too high relative to






To solve for the optimal contract, we maximize GP expected payoﬀ subject to the investor
break-even constraint, the incentive compatibility condition 5.5, the ﬂy-by-night condition, the
monotonicity condition, and Condition 5.4 on the required amount of per period ex ante capi-
tal K. The full maximization problem is given in the Appendix. The optimal security design is
characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. T h ee xa n t ec a p i t a lK per period should be set maximal at K∗ = I−(αL +( 1− αL)p)Z.
An optimal contract (which is not always unique) is given by














The mixed ﬁnancing contracts are similar to the pure ex ante contracts. As in the pure ex ante
case, it is essential to give the ex ante investors an equity component to avoid risk-shifting by the
GP, so that he does not pick bad ﬁrms whenever he has invested in good ﬁrms or has the chance
to do so in the future. At the same time, a debt component is necessary to screen out ﬂy-by-night
operators.
The intuition for why fund capital K per period should be set as high as possible is the following:
The higher GP payoﬀs are if he passes up bad ﬁrms in period 1, the easier it is to implement the
equilibrium. The GP only gets a positive payoﬀ if he reaches the good state in period 2 and succeeds
with the period 2 investment, so it would help to transfer some of his expected proﬁts to this state
from states where he has two successful investments. This is possible to do by changing the ex
21ante securities, since ex ante investors only have to break even unconditionally. However, ex post
investors break even state by state, so the more ex post capital the GP has to rely on, the less
room there is for this type of transfer, and the harder it is to satisfy the GP incentive compatibility
condition.
5.3. Optimality of third party ﬁnancing
We now show that it is essential in the mixed ﬁnancing solution that ex post and ex ante investors
be diﬀerent parties. One could have imagined that instead of going to a third party for ex post
capital, the GP can go back to the ex ante investor and ask for more capital. However, it will often
be ex post optimal for the limited partner to refuse ﬁnancing in the second period if no investment
was made in the ﬁrst period. This in turn undermines the GP’s incentive to pass up a bad ﬁrm in
period 1, so that the mixed ﬁnancing equilibrium cannot be upheld.
To show this result formally, suppose that the average project in the high state does not break
even:
(αH +( 1− αH)p)Z<I
Now suppose we consider a possible contract between the GP and the LP, in which the GP has
to ask the LP additional ﬁnancing each period if he wants to invest in a ﬁrm. Any such contract
would specify a split of the ﬁnal fund cash ﬂows wGP (x),w I (x) such that wGP (x)+wI (x)=x,
where possibly the structure of the securities are renegotiated depending on the outcome of the
bargaining between the GP and the LP when the GP asks for extra ﬁnancing. In keeping with
the contracting limitations we have assumed before, the ex ante contract cannot be contingent on
the state of the economy. Therefore, in period 2, the contract would either specify that the LP is
forced to provide the extra ﬁnancing regardless of state, or that the LP can choose not to provide
extra ﬁnancing.
Suppose no investment has been made in period 1, that the high state is realized in period 2,
and that the GP asks the LP for extra ﬁnancing. Because of the ﬂy-by-night condition, the GP
will ask the LP for extra ﬁnancing regardless of the quality of the period 2 ﬁrm, since otherwise
he will earn nothing. If the LP refuses to ﬁnance the investment, whatever amount 2K that was
invested initially into the fund will have to revert back to the LP so as not to violate the ﬂy-by-night
condition. If the LP agrees and allows an investment, the maximum expected pay oﬀ for the LP is
(αH +( 1− αH)p)Z − I +2 K<2K
Therefore, the LP will veto the investment. Clearly, he will also veto it in the low state since his
returns will be even lower. Thus, there can be no investment in period 2 if there was none in period
1. But then, the GP has no incentive to pass up a bad ﬁrm encountered in period 1, so the mixed
22ﬁnancing equilibrium breaks down.
Proposition 6. The mixed ﬁnancing equilibrium cannot be implemented without a third party
ﬁnancier.
In light of this reasoning, we can see the beneﬁt of using banks as a second source of ﬁnance
more clearly. We need ex post investors to make the contract more state contingent so that we can
cut oﬀ ﬁnancing in the low state in the second period while preserving ﬁnancing in the high state.
However, it may be necessary to subsidise the ex post investors in the high state if the average
project does not break even. This is not possible unless we have two sets of investors where the
ex ante investors commit to use some of the surplus they gain in other states to subsidise ex post
investors.
This result separates our theory of leverage from previous theories, such as those relying on tax
or incentive beneﬁts of debt. Those beneﬁts can be achieved without two sets of investors. Also,
it shows that it will typically be ineﬃcient to give LPs the right to approve individual deals. If
LPs did have this right, their optimal strategy would be to veto any investment occuring in period
2 if an investment had not already been made in period 1. Of course, their ability to pursue this
strategy would cause the mixed strategy equilibrium to break down, and the result would be less
eﬃcient investment. The model therefore also provides an explanation for why GPs are typically
given complete control over their funds’ investment policies.
5.4. Feasibility
The equilibrium which combines ex ante and ex post ﬁnancing is strictly more eﬃcient than either
the pure ex post or pure ex ante cases considered above. A shortcoming of the mixed ﬁnancing
equilibrium is that, as opposed to the other cases, it is not always implementable, even when it
creates surplus. The diﬃculty in implementing the equilibrium occurs because it is now harder
than in the ex ante case to provide the GP with incentives to avoid investing in bad ﬁrms in the
ﬁrst period. If he deviates and invests, not only will he be allowed to invest also in the low state
in period 2, but he will be perceived as being good in the high state, meaning that he can raise ex
post capital more cheaply.
The following proposition gives the conditions under which the equilibrium is implementable:
Proposition 7. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium to be implementable are
that it creates social surplus, that
q(αH +( 1− αH)p) ≥ p (5.6)
23and that
αL +( 1− αL)p








+ αL +( 1− αL)p
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Proof: See appendix.
This proposition implies that the equilibrium can be implemented if the average project quality
in high states (i.e. αH+(1− αH)p)i ss u ﬃciently good, compared both to the overall quality of bad
projects (p) and the average in project quality in low states (αL+(1− αL)p). In other words, if the
project quality does not improve suﬃciently in high states, it will not be possible to implement this
equilibrium. If project quality does not improve much in the high state, however, the eﬃciency gain
from combining ex ante and ex post ﬁnancing will be small compared to pure ex ante ﬁnancing.
Hence, when the eﬃciency gain from this equilibrium is large, it will also be feasible to implement.
It should also be noted that when the mixed ﬁnancing equilibrium is not feasible, there may be
other less eﬃcient mixed ﬁnancing equilibria that are. For example, there are equilibria in which
the GP uses a mixed strategy in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da n ds o m e t i m e si n v e s t se v e nw h e nh eh a sab a d
project. These types of equilibria can still dominate pure ex ante and pure ex post ﬁnancing. In
the interest of brevity we do not fully characerize these equilibria here, but the qualitative point is
the same: Mixed ﬁnancing is likely to dominate because it combines the internal incentives of the
pure ex ante case with the external screening that ex post ﬁnancing provides.
5.5. Features of the equilibrium and robustness
The mixed ﬁnancing equilibrium has a number of features that are worth highlighting. First, even
though the solution is the most eﬃcient that can be implemented, there are still investment distor-
tions. As is seen in Figure 5.1, there is overinvestment in the good state since some bad investments
are made, and there is underinvestment in bad states since some good investments get passed up.
As a result, the natural industry cycles get multiplied, and private equity investment will exhibit
particularly large cyclicality.
Second, this investment pattern will aﬀect the returns on the investments. The model predicts
that in bad times, some good investments are ignored and in good times, some bad investments are
undertaken. Thus, the average quality of investments taken in bad times will exceed that of those
taken in good times. This prediction is consistent with industry folklore, as well as with the evidence
of Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Kaplan and Stein (1993) that hot private equity markets are
associated with increased transaction prices and depressed subsequent investment performance.18
Third, another essential feature of our equilibrium is that the GP is not allowed to invest more
than K of the fund’s capital in any given investment. In the case when the GP did not invest in
18Also, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) show that private equity funds raised in periods with high fundraising tend to
underperform funds raised in periods with low fundraising. Although this ﬁnding seems consistent with our model,
they do not explicitly look at the performance of individual investments undertaken in hot versus cold markets.
24period 1, the GP would otherwise have an incentive to use the whole fund capital, 2K,t oﬁnance a
deal in the second period, and the equilibrium would break down. Similarly, if the GPs were allowed
to back the ex post securities with total fund cash ﬂows, rather than just the cash ﬂows from an
individual deal, this would be equivalent to using the ﬁrst period capital to back the second period
ex post debt. Hence, the model implies that contracts should impose restrictions on the amount of
fund capital that can be used in a given deal, and prohibit GPs from using total fund cash ﬂows to
back ﬁnancing for particular deals. In fact, both these restrictions are commonplace in real world
private equity partnership agreements, as has been shown in Gompers and Lerner (1996).
Fourth, just as in the pure ex ante ﬁnancing case, with mixed ﬁnancing the ex ante investors
cannot always be held to their break-even constraint and will sometimes be left with some rents
in equilibrium. These rents should occur even if there is a competitive fund-raising market. Thus,
the model provides a potential explanation of the Kaplan and Schoar (2004) ﬁnding that limited
partners sometimes appear to earn predictable excess returns.
Fifth, the model we have analyzed is a two-period model, and it is not clear to what extent our
results would hold up in a multi-period setup. Nonetheless, we can make some conjectures about
this case. First, it is clear that if we were to let the fund life go towards an inﬁnite number of
periods, we would approach ﬁrst best investment with pure ex ante ﬁnancing. As the fund life goes
to inﬁnity, the GP will be certain that he will eventually encounter enough good investments to
provide suﬃcient incentives to avoid all bad ones. Clearly inﬁnitely-lived private equity funds are
not observed in practice; there are a number of reasons outside of the model such as LP liquidity
constraints, that are likely explain this observation.19 If we take a ﬁnite fund life as given, it is likely
that mixed ex ante and ex post ﬁnancing will still be optimal, as long as the state of the world is
suﬃciently persistent. For example, suppose that the GP encounters a low state early in the fund’s
life, where good deals are very scarce, and that this low state is expected to last for a long time.
If such a GP had suﬃcient ﬁnancing to invest without going to the capital market for additional
ﬁnancing, then even in a multi-period setup, the GP potentially could have incentives to take bad
investments. Ex post ﬁnancing, which implicitly takes account of the state of the economy, would
prevent such GPs from acting on these incentives.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
A voluminous literature in corporate ﬁnance concerns the capital structure of public ﬁrms and the
manner in which ﬁrms decide to ﬁnance investments. Yet, much ﬁnancing today is done through
private capital markets, by private equity ﬁrms who receive funding from limited partners and use
this money to ﬁnance investments, including both new ventures and buyouts of existing companies.
19One potential explanation for limited fund life is provided by Stein (2005), who develops a model where funds
are open-end rather than closed-end because of asymmetric information about fund manager ability.
25These ﬁrms generally have a common ﬁnancial structure: They are ﬁnite-lived limited partnerships
who raise equity capital from limited partners before any investments are made (or even discovered)
and then supplement this equity ﬁnancing with third party outside ﬁnancing at the individual deal
level whenever possible. General partners have most decision rights, and receive a percentage of
the proﬁts (usually 20%), which is junior to all other securities. Yet, while this ﬁnancial structure
is responsible for a very large quantity of investment, we have no theory explaining why it should
be so prevalent.
This paper presents a model of the ﬁnancial structure of a private equity ﬁrm. In the model,
a ﬁrm can ﬁnance its investments either ex ante, by pooling capital across future deals, or ex
post, by ﬁnancing deals when the GP ﬁnds out about them. The ﬁnancial structure chosen is
the one that maximizes the value of the fund. Financial structure matters because managers have
better information about deal quality than potential investors, leading to both underinvestment
and overinvestment in equilibrium. The value maximizing ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrm minimizes
the losses both from expected bad investments that are undertaken and good investments that are
ignored.
Underlying the model is the notion that the governance problems inside private equity funds
are fundamentally problematic, even more so than those of a public corporation. Once funds are
committed, there is very little that limited partners can do if they become dissatisﬁed with fund
management. Unlike shareholders in public ﬁrms, limited partners in private equity funds do not
have the right to sell their partnership interests, nor do they have the right to vote out the general
partners. Our model suggests that a number of contractual features common to private equity
funds potentially arise as ways of partially alleviating these governance problems.
First, the model suggests that fund managers will be compensated using a proﬁt sharing arrange-
ment that balances the desire the to pay the GP for performance with the sharing of proﬁts with
investors to mitigate excessive risk-taking. The optimal proﬁt sharing arrangements are likely to
be somewhat nonlinear, as is illustrated in Figure 4.1. This prediction mimics common practice, in
which fund managers receive carried interest, or ‘carry’, usually of 20% (see Gompers and Lerner
(1999a)). In fact, most partnership contracts give managers a nonlinear proﬁt-sharing schedule
similar to the one that is optimal in the model. In a typical scheme, limited partners receive all
the cash ﬂows until they reach a speciﬁed level (usually the value of the equity originally commit-
ted, sometimes with a ‘preferred return’ on top of the return of capital), then a ‘General Partner’s
Carried Interest Catch Up’ region, in which general partners receive 100% of the proﬁts, with the
proﬁts split 80-20 between the limited and general partners above that region.
Second, the model suggests that funds will be designed so that investments are pooled within
a fund. By pooling investments, fund managers will have incentives to avoid bad investments
because they will dilute the returns to the other investments in the fund. Probably because of this
reason, most private equity funds do pool investments within funds, and base the GPs carry on
26the combined proﬁts from the pooled investments rather than having an individual carry based on
the proﬁts of each deal, a practice known as "aggregation". In fact, according to Schell (2006), it
was common for private equity funds in the 1970’s and early 1980’s to calculate carried interest on
a deal by deal basis. This practice was gradually replaced by aggregation, however, and today the
deal by deal approach is virtually non-existent. The reason for the disappearance of the deal by deal
approach was that it "...is fundamentally dysfunctional from an alignment of interest perspective.
It tends to create a bias in favor of higher risk and potentially higher return investments. The
only cost to a General Partner if losses are realized on a particular investment are reputational and
the General Partner’s share of the capital applied to the particular investment." (Schell, 2006, pp.
2.12-2.13). This observation is very much in line with the intuition of our theoretical model.
Third, the model suggests that ﬁnancial structure of private equity fund will be such that most
investments require a combination of ex ante ﬁnancing, that is raised at the time the fund is formed,
a n de xp o s tﬁnancing, that is raised deal by deal. The advantage of ex ante ﬁnancing is that it
improves incentives by for pooling across deals, while ex post ﬁnancing implicitly relies on the
capital markets to take account of public information about the current state of the economy as a
whole, or even of a particular industry. In fact, investments ﬁnanced by the private equity industry
typically do rely on both kinds of ﬁnancing. Buyouts are typically leveraged to a substantial degree,
receiving debt from banks and other sources. Venture deals are often syndicated, with a lead venture
capitalist raising funds from partners, who presumably take account of, at a minimum, information
on the state of the economy and industry in the same way that banks providing ﬁnancing to
buyouts do. Our model also implies that the third party ﬁnancing has to be suﬃciently risky
for the availability of ﬁnancing to be suﬃciently state-contingent. This provides an explanation
for some standard features of limited partnership agreements (see Gompers and Lerner, 1996).
In particular, standard covenants include restrictions on any one investment to no more than a
prespeciﬁed fraction of the fund’s capital (usually 20%), which forces the fund to seek third-party
ﬁnancing for at least all investments larger than this level. Similarly, partnership agreements
typically prohibit taking on leverage at the fund level, which would make debt less risky and less
state-contingent relative to levering up each individual deal.
Fourth, the model also provides an explanation of why GPs are left with so much discretion over
the investment decisions, a practice that at ﬁrst may appear to be one that exacerbates potential
agency problems. In fact, we show that on the contrary the discretion is an important ingredient
of the fund incentive scheme, and that removing it by giving limited partners decision rights over
individual deals would lower the expected quality of investments that are undertaken.
The model predicts that while these provisions will serve to mitigate governance problems
to some degree, investments nonetheless will deviate from the ﬁrst best. In particular, observed
investments in the private equity market should be more cyclical than the ﬁrst-best investments,
with the already procyclical nature of investment opportunities augmented by overinvestment in
27good times and underinvestment in bad times. In addition, consistent with both casual observation
(the internet and biotech bubbles) as well as more formal empirical evidence, this overinvestment
and underinvestment predicts that average returns to investments made during booms will be worse
than returns to investments made during recessions.
The intuitions coming from our model are also consistent with other common observations
about the private equity industry. First, general partners almost always are required to contribute
personally 1% of the ex ante capital raised by the funds. The incentives arising from this ownership
stake serve to align the interests of general and limited partners. In the context of our model, to the
extent the GPs have some wealth of their own, its investment in the fund would potentially mitigate
some agency problems. Still, as long as GP wealth is limited so that the fund has to rely largely on
the external capital from LPs, agency problems will remain and the fund structures derived above
will still be optimal. Second, there are indeed circumstances where investors do provide ﬁnancing
for individual deals. Sellers sometimes provide partial ﬁnancing of their ﬁrms, and GPs approach
LPs for coinvestment opportunities. Each of these types of ﬁnancing can be thought of in terms of
our model in that they all occur in circumstances where the degree of information asymmetry is
likely to be low. For example, when a seller helps to ﬁnance a deal, it typically supplements bank
ﬁnancing and is likely to occur when the seller has better information about his ﬁrm than the bank.
When funds ask LPs to coinvest, our model suggests that they should be more sophisticated LPs,
who can evaluate the deal themselves and be assured that it is a good investment. Finally, in those
circumstances where speciﬁc funds are raised to ﬁnance particular deals, there should be a good
reason why the initiating GP did not do the entire investment by himself. One potential reason is
that the fund could be constrained in the size of its investment by its charter; an example of such
a situation is Exxel’s acquisitions of Argencard and Norte (see Hoye and Lerner (1995), Ballve and
Lerner (2001)).
However, our model falls short in that it fails to address a number of important features of
private equity funds. First, private equity funds tend to be ﬁnitely-lived; we provide no rationale
for such a ﬁnite life. Second, our model does not incorporate the role of general partners’ personal
reputations. Undoubtedly these reputations, which provide the ability for GPs to raise future
funds, are a very important consideration in private equity investment decisions. Third, while one
might expect much of our analysis to apply equally to hedge funds, it is not clear that it does.
Hedge funds are ﬁnanced predominately by levered equity and we have no explanation for this
phenomenon. Fourth, we still do not fully understand the diﬀerent investment incentives of private
equity funds and regular ﬁrms. Indeed, if we relabel the GP as the CEO, and replace the private
equity investments with internal ﬁrm projects, it seems that we would have a model of internal
capital markets. Still, this analogy is limited by some important features of ﬁrms, such as the
fact that ﬁrms have inﬁnite lives and that payoﬀs of individual projects within a ﬁrm are diﬃcult
to disentangle and contract on. Finally, while we identify potential investment distortions arising
28even when funds use the optimal ﬁnancial structure, we do not have a clear understanding of what
practitioners and policy-makers could conceivably do to minimize these distortions. Knowing about
any conceivable such policies clearly is a potentially valuable contribution to the study of, as well
as the practice of, private equity.
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7 . 1 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
We show that the solution postulated in the proposition is Perfect Bayesian and also satisﬁes the
Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) (deﬁned below for our particular application). The
one-period problem is straight-forward and solved in the text. The repeated problem has the added
feature that investor beliefs about the type of the GP may change after observing ﬁnancing and
investment behavior in the ﬁrst period, which in turn gives an extra signalling incentive in the ﬁrst
period.
Therefore, we have to show that the static equilibrium solution is also an equilibrium in the
second period after ﬂy-by-night operators have been screened out. In each period and state, the GP
decides whether to not seek ﬁnancing, or seek ﬁnancing with some security w = {wI (I),w I (Z)}
satisfying monotonicity and limited liability. If the GP seeks ﬁnancing, the investor then chooses
whether to accept and supply ﬁnancing I in exchange for security w, or deny ﬁnancing in which
case the game ends. If the investor accepts, the GP then decides whether to invest in a ﬁrm or the
risk-free asset.
We start by analyzing the set of continuation equilibria in the second period. First, it is easy
to see that there can never be a separating equilibrium where diﬀerent types of GPs seek ﬁnancing
with diﬀerent securities w. This is so since the investor never breaks even on a security issued by a
ﬂy-by-nighter or a GP with a bad project, so those types will always have an incentive to mimic a
good type. In a ﬁnancing equilibrium where GPs issue security w, the investor will have some set of
beliefs over the type of GPs that seek ﬁnancing. Denote by μ the probability the investor attaches
to the GP being a ﬂy-by-night operator, where we leave μ arbitrary for now. Given μ, however, we
require that in an equilibrium involving ﬁnancing with security w the investor attaches probability
(1 − μ)α and (1 − μ)(1− α) with α ∈ {αH,α L} for the probabilities that a GP seeking ﬁnancing
has access to a good and a bad ﬁrm, respectively. We also use the following tie-breaking rules: If
the GP ﬁnds a bad ﬁrm and is indiﬀerent between investing in it or the riskfree security, he invests
in the bad ﬁrm. A ﬂy-by-night operator always invests in the riskfree security, as he earns nothing
in the second period by investing in a wasteful project.
We now state the Intuitive Criterion that a ﬁnancing equilibrium must satisfy in the second
period. (The general deﬁnition can be found in Cho and Kreps (1987); We state the particular
version that applies to our setting). Suppose security w satisﬁes monotonicity and limited liability,








where the second row reﬂects the fact that GPs who ﬁnd bad ﬁrms risk-shift unless I − wI (I) >
p(Z − wI (Z)). The security design w is a ﬁnancing equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion if
a n do n l yi ft h e r ei sno security design w0 satisfying monotonicity and limited liability such that:
1. Investors would be willing to ﬁnance the deal in exchange for w0 if they believe the issuing
GP is good:
w0
I (Z) ≥ I
2. Fly-by-night operators and GPs ﬁnding bad ﬁrms are strictly worse oﬀ issuing w0 than they
are in the postulated equilibrium, even if investors are willing to ﬁnance the deal in exchange
for w0:
w0









< max(I − wI (I),p(Z − wI (Z)))
3. GPs ﬁnding good ﬁrms are strictly better oﬀ issuing w0 than they are in the postulated
equilibrium if investors are willing to ﬁnance the deal in exchange for w0:
w0
I (Z) <w I (Z)
If there were such a security w0, and it was issued out of equilibrium, we assume that investors
would conclude that the issuing GP must be good. If investors have that belief, good GPs would
indeed be better oﬀ issuing security w0, so w cannot be an equilibrium. (To rule out w as an
equilibrium, it is essential that there is a w0 that is only preferred by GPs ﬁnding good ﬁrms. If
we cannot rule out that GPs ﬁnding bad ﬁrms might also be better oﬀ if ﬁnanced by w0, investors
could rationally believe that anyone oﬀering w0 out of equilibrium is bad, so that a best response
could be to not supply ﬁnancing for w0.)
The following Lemma shows that it is impossible to have a ﬁnancing equilibrium where GPs
who ﬁnd bad projects pass it up in favor of a risk-free investment.
Lemma 3. Given beliefs μ about the set of ﬂy-by-night operators who seek ﬁnancing and invest in
31the ﬁrst period, necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a security design w satisfying monotonicity
and limited liability to be a ﬁnancing equilibrium in the second period are:
p(Z − wI (Z)) ≥ I − wI (I)
(GP’s who ﬁnd bad ﬁrms prefer to risk-shift) and
μwI (I)+( 1− μ)(α + p(1 − α))wI (Z) ≥ I
(Investors break even).
Proof: To show necessity of the ﬁrst condition, suppose, contrary to the claim in the lemma,
that there is an equilibrium security w such that
p(Z − wI (Z)) <I− wI (I)
Then, GPs who ﬁnd a bad ﬁrm prefer to pass it up and invest in the risk free asset. Also, suppose
that w satisﬁes the break even condition:
(μ +( 1− μ)(1− α))wI (I)+( 1− μ)αwI (Z) ≥ I
These two conditions together with limited liability and monotonicity imply that wI (I) <I<
wI (Z). Then, there is always another security w0 such that w0
I (I) >w I (I) and I<w 0
I (Z) <
wI (Z). It is easy to check that both ﬂy-by-night operators and GPs who ﬁnd bad ﬁrms are strictly
better oﬀ in the equilibrium than if they issue security w0, while GPs who ﬁnd good ﬁrms are
strictly better oﬀ with security w0 if investors provide ﬁnancing for it. But the intuitive criterion
then says that investors should attach probability 1 to a GP having a good ﬁrm if he deviates and
issues security w0, and would therefore provide ﬁnancing for it. That in turn means that w cannot
be an equilibrium. Thus, in any ﬁnancing equilibrium, GPs who ﬁnd bad ﬁrms will risk-shift, and
this gives the necessary break even condition as in the lemma. To show that the two conditions in
the lemma are also suﬃcient, note that any security w0 such that GPs who ﬁnd good ﬁrms would
strictly prefer to deviate to it must have w0
I (Z) <w I (Z). But if p(Z − wI (Z)) ≥ I −wI (I), that
means that any GP who ﬁnds a bad ﬁrm would also have an incentive to deviate to w0. End proof.
The lemma implies that there can be no ﬁnancing in the low state in the second period, regardless
of what happened in the ﬁrst period, since the unconditional project in the low state does not break
even. In the high state, debt as in the proposition is a ﬁnancing equilibrium for any μ as long as
the unconditional project in the high state breaks even Thus, the static solution is an equilibrium
whatever happened in the ﬁrst period. But then, the static solution is also an equilibrium in the
ﬁrst period.
327 . 2 .P r o o fo fL e m m a1
To implement the investment behavior in Figure 4.2, we ﬁrst check that the GP always invests in
good ﬁrms regardless of what other investments he has made. For any random variable y ∈ {0,I,Z}
resulting from investment behavior in a period, the condition for this is:
E (wGP (Z + y)) ≥ E (wGP (I + y))
This holds automatically from the monotonicity condition. It remains to check that the GP does
not invest in bad ﬁr m si np e r i o d2a f t e ri n v e s t i n gi nag o o dﬁrm in period 1, and that the GP
does not invest in bad ﬁr m si np e r i o d1 .U s i n gt h a twGP (0) = wGP (I)=wGP (2I)=0from the
ﬂy-by-night constraint, the incentive compatibility conditions are:
wGP (Z + I) ≥ (1 − p) wGP (Z)+pw GP (2Z) (7.1)
(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p) wGP (Z + I) (7.2)
≥ (1 − p)E (α)wGP (Z)
+p(1 − E (α))wGP (Z + I)+pE (α)wGP (2Z)
(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p) wGP (Z + I) (7.3)
≥ ((1 − p)E (α)+2 p(1 − p)(1− E (α))) wGP (Z)
+
¡
pE (α)+p2 (1 − E (α))
¢
wGP (2Z)
The ﬁrst condition assures that the GP does not invest in a bad ﬁrm in period 2 after investing
in a good ﬁrm in period 1. The two last conditions assure that the GP does not invest in a bad
ﬁrm in period 1. The two conditions diﬀer only on the right hand side, corresponding to the two
possible oﬀ-equilibrium investment decisions in period 2: Only investing in good ﬁrms in period
2 after making a bad investment in period 1 (Condition 7.2), or investing in all ﬁr m si np e r i o d2
(Condition 7.3).
Deducting (1 − E (α))pwGP (Z + I) from both sides of Condition 7.2 and dividing by E (α),
we see that it is identical to Condition 7.1.
Rearranging Condition 7.3, we get
wGP (Z + I) ≥
(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p)+( 1− E(α))p
(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p)
(1 − p)wGP (Z)+pw GP (2Z) (7.4)
Note that this implies Condition 7.1, and is therefore a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
33incentive compatibility.
7.3. Proof of Proposition 2:
We need to solve for optimal values of wGP (Z),w GP (Z + I), and wGP (2Z). We start by estab-
lishing the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Holding wGP (Z + I) ﬁxed, we should set wGP (Z) as low as possible in an optimal
contract: wGP (Z)=m a x( 0 ,w GP (Z + I) − I)
Proof: F i r s tn o t et h a tw em u s th a v ewGP (Z) ≥ max(0,w GP (Z + I) − I) from monotonicity
and limited liability. Suppose contrary to the claim that wGP (Z) > max(0,w GP (Z + I) − I) in an
optimal contract. Then, we can relax the IC constraint by decreasing wGP (Z) without violating
M or FBN. The maximand and the break even constraint are unaﬀected by this, since x = Z
does not happen in equilibrium so that wGP (Z) does not enter the maximand or the break even
constraint. QED.






2E (α)(1− E (α)) + (1 − E (α))
2 p
´
wGP (Z + I)
such that
E (α)
2 (2Z − wGP (2Z)) (BE)
+
³
2E (α)(1− E (α)) + (1 − E (α))
2 p
´
(Z + I − wGP (Z + I))
+(1− E (α))
2 (1 − p)I ≥ 2I
(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p)wGP (Z + I) ≥ (IC)
((1 − p)E (α)+2 p(1 − p)(1− E (α)))max(0,w GP (Z + I) − I)
+p(E (α)+( 1− E (α))p)wGP (2Z)
x − x0 ≥ wGP (x) − wGP (x0) ≥ 0 ∀x,x0 s.t. x>x 0 (M)
wGP (x)=0 ∀x s.t. x ≤ 2I (FBN)
Lemma 5. In the optimal contract under pure ex ante ﬁnancing, we will either have (1) wGP (Z + I)=
Z − I and wGP (2Z)=Z − I +( 1− k)(Z − I),w h e r e0 <k<1 or (2) wGP (Z + I) <Z− I and
wGP (2Z)=wGP (Z + I).
Proof: Suppose not. Then, we will show that you can relax the IC constraint by increasing
wGP (Z + I) and decreasing wGP (2Z) without violating FBN, M or BE.Note that if wGP (Z + I)=
Z−I or wGP (2Z)=wGP (Z + I),w GP (Z + I) cannot be increased without violating monotonicity.
34Case 1: Suppose wGP(Z)=0>w GP(Z + I) − I. Then, increase wGP (Z + I) and decrease
wGP (2Z) to keep the break even constraint and the maximand constant:
−dwGP (2Z)=
2E (α)(1− E (α)) + (1 − E (α))
2 p
E (α)
2 dwGP (Z + I)
This relaxes IC.
Case 2: wGP (Z)=wGP (Z + I)−I. Doing the same perturbation, we show that IC is relaxed.
Moving all terms to the LHS of IC, the change in the LHS is equal to
1 −
E (α)+( 1− E(α))2p
E(α)+( 1− E(α))p
(1 − p)+




We show that this is positive. The derivative w.r.t. to p of the expression above is equal to
1 − (1 − E(α))
(1 − 2p)E(α) − p2 (1 − E(α))
(E(α)+( 1− E(α))p)
2 +
2E (α)(1− E (α)) + 2(1 − E (α))(1 − E (α))p
E (α)
2








This follows since E (α)
2 ≤ (E(α)+( 1− E(α))p)
2 , and since (1 − 2p) < 2. Thus, if the change is
non-negative for p =0 ,I Cis relaxed. Substituting for p =0 , the change becomes zero. QED
Using the above results and the fact that wI (x)=x − wGP (x), we see that the optimal
investor security wI is a combination of debt with face value wI (Z + I) ≥ 2I, a n da ne q u i t yp i e c e
wI (2Z) − wI (Z + I) given by
wI (2Z) − wI (Z + I)=Z − I if wI (Z + I) > 2I
wI (2Z) − wI (Z + I) ∈ [0,Z− I] if wI (Z + I)=2 I
,s ot h a twI (x) is as in the proposition.
We now show that the equilibrium is always implementable as long as it generates social surplus.
Suppose you give the GP the following contract:
wGP (Z)=0
wGP (Z + I)=ε
wGP (2Z)=ε
For ε>0, the IC condition holds strictly. Making ε small, an arbitrarily large fraction of cash
ﬂows can be given to investors, and M and FBN hold. Therefore, the BE condition can always
be made to hold as long as the equilibrium creates social surplus.
35End proof.
7.4. Proof of Proposition 3:
First, we show that if p>1
2, the condition in the proposition is necessary and suﬃcient for the LP
to get positive rents. Then, we show that when p<1
2, the GP captures all the rents.
Suppose p>1
2. T h e n ,w em u s th a v eZ<2I, or else investing in the bad ﬁrm is a positive
NPV project. This also implies that wGP (Z)=0from the ﬂy-by-night condition, so that the IC
constraint becomes
wGP (Z + I) ≥ pwGP (2Z)
Suppose we set




Note that this is the maximal values of wGP (Z + I) and wGP (2Z) such that the IC constraint is
satisﬁed. In turn, that means that if the break even constraint of the LP is slack at this contract,
LPs will earn strictly positive rents for any incentive compatible contract. Plugging in the contract










2E (α)(1− E (α)) + (1 − E (α))
2 p
´
2I +( 1− E (α))
2 (1 − p)I ≥ 2I








+( 1− E (α))
2 (1 − p)I ≥
³
E (α)
2 +( 1− E (α))
2 (1 − p)
´
2I
Dividing by (1 − E (α))
2 and gathering terms gives the condition in the proposition. If this condition
is not satisﬁed, decreasing wGP (Z + I) and wGP (2Z) while keeping the IC constraint constant can
be made until the LP just breaks even, so in that case the GP captures all the rent.
We now show that for p<1
2, the GP captures all the surplus.
Case 1: Z ≤ 2I. Again, wGP (Z)=0from the ﬂy-by-night condition, so that the IC constraint
is
wGP (Z + I) ≥ pwGP (2Z)
Note that if we set
wGP (Z + I)=k(Z − I)
wGP (2Z)=k2(Z − I)
36for k ∈ [0,1] t h eI Cc o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed since p<1
2. Then, there is always a k such that LPs just
break even if the social surplus is positive, since at k =1they do not break even and at k =0they
get the whole social surplus. Thus, the GP captures all the surplus.
Case 2: Z>2I. For this case, suppose we set wGP (Z + I)=Z − I a n d ,a c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a
4, wGP (Z)=Z − 2I. The break even constraint of the LP then becomes
E (α)
2 (2Z − wGP (2Z)) +
³
2E (α)(1− E (α)) + (1 − E (α))
2 p
´
2I +( 1− E (α))
2 (1 − p)I ≥ 2I
Suppose we force this to hold with equality and solve for wGP (2Z):
E (α)
2 (2Z − wGP (2Z)) + (1 − E (α))
2 (1 − p)I =
³
E (α)
2 +( 1− E (α))




wGP (2Z)=2 ( Z − I) −
µ
1 − E (α)
E (α)
¶2
(1 − p)I (7.5)
First, suppose wGP (2Z) as deﬁned above is lower than Z−I,in which case monotonicity is violated.
T h e n ,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tt h e r ei sa l w a y sa nx<Z− I such that we can set
wGP (2Z)=wGP (Z + I)=x
wGP (Z)=m a x ( 0 ,x− I)
and such that the break even constraint is satisﬁed with equality and the IC constraint is slack.
Suppose instead that wGP (2Z) as deﬁned in Equation 7.5 is bigger than or equal to Z −I, so that
monotonicity is not violated. We now show that the IC constraint is satisﬁed for this contract, so
that the GP captures all the surplus. Plugging in for wGP (2Z) from above, the IC constraint is
slack if







(1 − p)(Z − 2I)
+p
Ã
2(Z − I) −
µ





Taking the derivative of the right hand side with respect to x ≡
1−E(α)
E(α) gives
2p(1 + xp) − p(1 + 2xp)
(1 + xp)
2 (1 − p)(Z − 2I) − 2px(1 − p)I (7.6)




This is decreasing in x. Thus, if it is negative for the lowest possible x, it is always negative. The
lowest possible x ≡
1−E(α)





































Thus, the derivative w.r.t. to
1−E(α)
E(α) is everywhere negative, and we should set
1−E(α)
E(α) as low as







Z−p into the IC constraint gives











(1 − p)(Z − 2I)
+p
⎛















(1 − p)I +
I − Zp
p











it is harder to satisfy the constraint if we divide the LHS by Z−I







(1 − p)I +
I − Zp
p














.T h u s ,t h eIC constraint is always satisﬁed when the investor just breaks even, which shows that
the GP captures the whole surplus.
7.5. Proof of Proposition 4:
In the ﬁrst period, and after no investment in the second, a necessary condition for the ex post
security is that wP,i(I) ≥ I − K. Otherwise, a ﬂy-by-night operator can collude with LP’s, raise
money from ex post investors, and invest it in the risk-free asset so that the coalition between the
LPs and the ﬂy-by-night operator gets strictly positive surplus. Thus, such a contract would attract
an inﬁnite set of ﬂy-by-night operators so that ex post investors cannot break even. This pins down
debt as the only feasible security in the ﬁrst period under the postulated equilibrium investment
behavior, where wP,1 (Z)=I − K. For the second period, if no investment was made, any ex post
security with wP,2 (Z)= I−K







is equivalent, so we
might as well restrict attention to debt.
I tr e m a i n st oa n a l y z et h es i t u a t i o ni nt h es e c o n dp e r i o dw h e r ea ni n v e s t m e n tw a sm a d ei np e r i o d
1. Under the equilibrium investment behavior, the period 1 investment should have been in a good
ﬁrm, and all ﬂy-by-night operators should be screened out. Also, if the GP ﬁnds a bad ﬁrm, he
should either not raise ﬁnancing, or raise ﬁnancing and invest in the risk-free asset. For this to be
incentive compatible, it has to be the case that either
wGP (Z − (I − K)+K) > 0 (7.7)
or
wGP (Z − (I − K)+I − wP,2 (I)) > 0 (7.8)
Otherwise, the GP is strictly better oﬀ investing in the bad project. Suppose ﬁrst that wP,2 (I) <
I − K. Then, condition 7.8 holds automatically from monotonicity if condition 7.7 holds, and so
39must always hold. Furthermore, we have to have
wGP (Z − (I − K)+I − wP,2 (I)) ≥ wGP (Z − (I − K)+K)
wI (Z − (I − K)+I − wP,2 (I)) ≥ wI (Z − (I − K)+K)
with at least one of these inequalities strict. Thus, the GP and LP individually are weakly better
oﬀ, and seen as a coalition are strictly better oﬀ raising capital I −K from the ex post investor and
investing it in the risk-free security than not raising any money. We therefore assume that the GP
will raise money in this situation. Assume that the GP does raise money and invests in the risk-free
asset by issuing security wP,2. Then, we have to have wP,2 (Z) >I−K for ex post investors to break
even. But then we can apply the logic in the proof of Proposition 1 and show that this security
does not satisfy the Cho and Kreps intuitive criterion, because a GP ﬁn d i n gag o o dﬁrm always has
an incentive to deviate and issue a security with w0
P,2 (Z)=wP,2 (Z) − ε1,w0
P,2 (I)=wP,2 (Z)+ε2
for some ε1,ε 2 > 0. T h u s ,w eh a v et oh a v ewP,2 (I)=I −K. Since only GPs ﬁnding good ﬁrms are
s u p p o s e dt oi n v e s t ,w eh a v et oh a v ewP,2 (Z)=I − K. Thus, debt is the only possible security.
7 . 6 .P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
If the GP invested in a good ﬁrm in period 1, he will pass up a bad ﬁrm if:
wGP (Z − (I − K)+K) (7.9)
>p w GP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))
The last term is the case where the bad ﬁrm does not pay oﬀ, and the fund defaults on its
period 2 ex post debt.
We also have to check the oﬀ-equilibrium behavior where the GP invested in a bad ﬁrm in
period 1. If the GP invested in a bad ﬁrm in period 1 he will pass up a bad ﬁrm in period 2 if:
pwGP (Z − (I − K)+K)+( 1− p)wGP (K)
>p 2wGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + p(1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))
+(1− p)pwGP (Z − (I − K))
The two last terms are, respectively, the case where the ﬁrst bad ﬁrm pays oﬀ and the second
does not, and the case where the ﬁrst bad ﬁrm does not pay oﬀ and the second does. Since
40wGP (K)=0from the ﬂy by night condition, this can be rewritten as
wGP (Z − (I − K)+K) (7.10)
>p w GP (2(Z − (I − K))) + 2(1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))
Note that this is a stricter condition than condition 7.9.
Given the period two incentive compatibility constraints, we can now consider the GP’s invest-
ment incentives in the ﬁrst period. In period 1, it is always optimal to invest in a good project.
We must check that the GP does not want to invest in a bad project to sustain the separating
equilibrium.
The condition for not investing in a bad project in period 1 becomes




αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K
¶
>E (α)(pwGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))) + (1 − E(α)) ∗
∗pmax(wGP (Z − (I − K)+K),pw GP (2(Z − (I − K))) + 2(1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K)))
T h el a s tl i n ei st h eG Pp a yo ﬀ when he has invested in a bad ﬁrm in period 1 and encounters
another bad ﬁrm in period 2, in which case he will either invest in it or not, depending on whether





αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K
¶
≤ wGP (Z − (I − K)+K)
and
E(α)
q(αH +( 1− αH)p)
(pwGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K)))
+
(1 − E(α))p
q(αH +( 1− αH)p)
max
Ã
wGP (Z − (I − K)+K),pw GP (2(Z − (I − K)))




q(αH +( 1− αH)p)
(pwGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K)))
≥ pwGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))
Thus, the only relevant incentive constraint is the period 1 IC constraint.
7.7. Proof of Proposition 5:
The full maximization problem can now be expressed as
41maxE (wGP (x))
= E (α)
2 wGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + E (α)(1− E (α))wGP (Z − (I − K)+K)








E (x − wGP (x)) ≥ 2K (BE)




αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K
¶
>E (α)(pwGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))) + (1 − E(α)) ∗
∗pmax[wGP (Z − (I − K)+K),pw GP (2(Z − (I − K))) + 2(1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))] (IC)
x − x0 ≥ wGP (x) − wGP
¡
x0¢
≥ 0 ∀x,x0 s.t. x>x 0 (M)
wGP (x)=0 ∀x s.t. x ≤ 2K, (FBN)
and
I − (αH +( 1− αH)p)Z ≤ K ≤ I − (αL +( 1− αL)p)Z
7.7.1. Proof that K = I − (αL +( 1− αL)p)Z :
We want to show that the ex ante capital K should be set maximal at K∗ = I− (αL +( 1− αL)p)Z.
First, we have to have Z − I−K
αH+(1−αH)p + K>Z− (I − K) and Z − I−K
αH+(1−αH)p + K>2K for
the equilibrium to be feasible, or else the IC condition will not be satisﬁed. Suppose this is true,
so that cash-ﬂow states are ordered by
2(Z − (I − K))
>Z − (I − K)+K
>Z −
I − K
αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K
> max(Z − (I − K),2K)
>K
Suppose contrary to the claim in the proposition that K<K ∗ at some candidate optimal
contract wI satisfying monotonicity and limited liability.
42Now suppose we increase K by ∆ arbitrarily small, increase wI (K) by ∆, increase wI (2K) by
2∆,i n c r e a s ewI (Z − (I − K)) by
∆ if wI (Z − (I − K)) = Z − (I − K)















2 + E (α)(1− E (α)) + (1 − E (α))q(αH +( 1− αH)p)
´
= ∆(1 − E (α))q(1 − αH)(1− p)
Note that for small ∆, these changes do not violate monotonicity or the ﬂy-by-night condition.






and wGP (Z − (I − K)+K) and wGP (2(Z − (I − K))) go down weakly. Hence, the problem is
relaxed, and we can increase K without loss of generality. Thus, there is no loss of generality from
setting K = K∗ in an optimal contract. End Proof.
7.7.2. Proof of optimal contract:
The second issue is how the investor and GP securities should be designed. We will derive the
securities under two diﬀerent cases.
7.7.3. Case 1: Z − (I − K∗) ≤ 2K∗
This is the case when the GP gets no payoﬀ if he fails with one project, so wGP (Z − (I − K∗)) = 0.
For this case, the IC condition reduces to




αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K∗
¶
>E (α)pwGP (2(Z − (I − K∗)))
+(1− E(α))pmax(wGP (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗),pw GP (2(Z − (I − K∗))))
Given a certain expected payoﬀ E (x − wGP (x)) to investors, the optimal contract should re-
lax the IC condition maximally without violating the ﬂy-by-night condition or the monotonicity






that keeps the expected value of the security constant relaxes the
constraint. The optimal contract is given in the following proposition:
43Proposition 8. : Suppose Z − (I − K∗) ≤ 2K∗. The optimal investor security wI (x) is debt











k(max(x − S,0)) starting at S ∈
h
Z − I−K∗
αH+(1−αH)p + K∗,Z− (I − K∗)+K∗
i
. For F =2 K∗, we
have k ∈ (0,1),S∈
h
Z − I−K∗
αH+(1−αH)p + K∗,Z− (I − K∗)+K∗
i
and for F>2K∗, we have k =1
(call option) and S = Z − I−K∗
αH+(1−αH)p + K∗.F o r a ﬁxed expected value E (wI (x)) given to
investors, F is set minimal.





> 2K∗. The optimal contract in the propo-
sition then claims that




αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K∗
¶
+( I − K∗) −
I − K∗
αH +( 1− αH)p
wI (2(Z − (I − K∗))) = wI (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗)+Z − I
Suppose this is not true. First, suppose




αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K∗
¶
+( I − K∗) −
I − K∗
αH +( 1− αH)p
wI (2(Z − (I − K∗))) ≤ wI (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗)+Z − I












the break even constraint and the maximand constant without violating monotonicity. This relaxes
the IC constraint and so improves the contract.
Now, suppose




αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K∗
¶
+( I − K∗) −
I − K∗
αH +( 1− αH)p
wI (2(Z − (I − K∗))) <w I (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗)+Z − I







E (α)(1− E (α)) + (1 − E (α))q(αH +( 1− αH)p)
to keep the break even constraint and the maximand constant without violating monotonicity. This












be lowered without violating the ﬂy by night condition.
44First, note that increasing wI (2(Z − (I − K∗))) by ε and reducing wI (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗) by
ε
E (α)
(1 − E (α))
to keep the break even constraint constant leaves the IC constraint unchanged if
wGP (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗) >p w GP (2(Z − (I − K∗)))
and relaxes it if
wGP (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗) <p w GP (2(Z − (I − K∗)))
. Therefore, if such a transfer does not violate monotonicity, it (weakly) relaxes the IC constraint.
Thus, a contract that maximally relaxes the IC constraint keeping the expected value E (w) constant
should have
wI (2(Z − (I − K∗))) = wI (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗)+Z − I
if w(X (Z,K∗)) > 2K∗. However, for such a contract we have
pwGP (2(Z − (I − K∗))) = p[2(Z − (I − K∗)) − (wI (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗)) + Z − I]
= pwGP (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗)
<w GP (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗)
and therefore the IC constraint is unchanged if we lower wI (2(Z − (I − K∗))) and increase wI
(Z − (I − K∗)+K∗) slightly so that
wI (2(Z − (I − K∗))) = wI (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗)+k(Z − I)
where k<1. Thus, this contract can be expressed as a carry. End proof.
7.7.4. Case 2: Z − (I − K∗) > 2K∗
This is the case when the GP can get some payoﬀ even if he fails with one project, so it is possible to
have wGP (Z − (I − K∗)) > 0.I ti sa l w a y so p t i m a lt os e twI (Z − (I − K∗)) as high as possible at
min
³





, s ot h ec o n t r a c tw i l lh a v ead e b tp i e c ea sb e f o r e





. However, it is no longer true that we want to set this
face value as low as possible given a ﬁxed E (wI ) by increasing the higher pay oﬀs. This is because
when we reduce the face value, we also increase the pay oﬀ t ot h eG Pi fh ef a i l sw i t ho n ea n d
succeeds with one ﬁrm, which can worsen incentives. The following proposition characterizes the
optimal contract.
45Proposition 9. Suppose Z − (I − K∗) > 2K∗. The optimal investor security wI (x) is debt











k(max(x − S,0)) starting at S ∈
h
Z − I−K∗
αH+(1−αH)p + K∗,Z− (I − K∗)+K∗
i
. For S<Z −
(I − K∗)+K∗, we have k =1(call option), and for S = Z − (I − K∗)+K∗, we have k ∈ (0,1).
Proof: We start with the following Lemma:
Lemma 6. wI (Z − (I − K∗)) = min
³











, the highest we can set wA (Z − (I − K∗))
is the expression in the lemma from monotonicity and the fact that Z − I−K∗
αH+(1−αH)p + K∗ >
Z − (I − K∗) in feasible contracts. Suppose wA (Z − (I − K∗)) is lower than this upper bound.
Then, we can increase it without changing the break even constraint and the maximand, since
the outcome Z − (I − K∗) does not happen in equilibrium. This relaxes the IC constraint and so
improves the contract.











. Then, the proposition
states that
w(2(Z − (I − K∗))) = wI (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗)+Z − I
which is the highest possible value for wI (2(Z − (I − K∗))) given wI (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗). Sup-
pose this is not the case. Then, we can lower wI (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗) and increase wI (2(Z − (I − K∗)))
to keep the break even constraint and the maximand constant without violating monotonicity. If
wGP (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗) >p w GP (2(Z − (I − K∗))) + 2p(1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K∗))
this does not change the IC constraint, but if
wGP (Z − (I − K∗)+K∗) <p w GP (2(Z − (I − K∗))) + 2p(1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K∗))
the IC constraint is relaxed and so this improves the contract. End Proof.
7.8. Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof: First, it is necessary that
Z + K −
I − K
αH +( 1− αH)p
> 2K
46or else the left hand side of the IC condition 5.5 is zero from monotonicity. Second, it is necessary
that
Z + K −
I − K
αH +( 1− αH)p






αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K
¶
≤ wGP (Z − (I − K))
This would violate the IC condition 5.5, since in that case the right hand side of the IC condition
becomes
E(α)[pwGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))] + (1 − E(α))p ∗
max(wGP (Z − (I − K)+K),pw GP (2(Z − (I − K))) + 2(1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K)))
≥ (E(α)+( 1− E(α))p)[pwGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))]








E(α)+( 1− E(α))p>q(αH +( 1− αH)p)
this is larger than the left hand side of the IC condition.
The two necessary conditions above can be rewritten as
I − K




αH +( 1− αH)p
<I
Note that both these are easier to satisfy for higher K, and by setting K maximal at K∗ from
Proposition 5, the conditions become
αL +( 1− αL)p
αH +( 1− αH)p
Z<Z− (I − (αL +( 1− αL)p)Z)
and
αL +( 1− αL)p
αH +( 1− αH)p
Z<I
These conditions together give the last expression in the proposition.
The ﬁrst part from the proposition is proved as follows. The right hand side of the IC condition
475.5 is given by
E(α)(pwGP (2(Z − (I − K))) + (1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K))) + (1 − E(α))p ∗
∗max(wGP (Z − (I − K)+K),pw GP (2(Z − (I − K))) + 2(1 − p)wGP (Z − (I − K)))





αH +( 1− αH)p
+ K
¶
where the last step follows from monotonicity. Therefore, the IC condition can only be satisﬁed if
q(αH +( 1− αH)p) ≥ p
Thus, this is a necessary condition for the equilibrium to be implementable. To show that
it together with the other conditions are suﬃcient, suppose they are satisﬁed. Then, for ε small
enough, it is always possible to set
wGP (Z − (I − K)) = 0









wGP (Z − (I − K)+K)=ε
For this contract, the IC condition reduces to
q(αH +( 1− αH)p) ≥ p
For ε small enough, investors always break even as long as social surplus is created. End Proof.
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